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A proposed law to tighten regulations on the trade of so called ‘conﬂict minerals’ was backed in the
European Parliament on 20 May. Christopher J. Ayres writes that while the legislation may be
well-intentioned, the net eﬀect could be to damage the interests of some of the people it is aimed at
helping.
A new EU law, which was backed in the European Parliament in a vote on 20 May, makes it
mandatory for companies dealing in certain minerals (Tungsten, Tin, Tantalite, Gold) that are
sourced in violence-ridden Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to follow a process of due
diligence and positively declare their products ‘conﬂict free’. Such products include mobile phones, laptops and other
electronic devices. The new EU legislation reﬂects a 2010 United States law known as section 1502 of the Dodd-
Frank Act (Dodd-Frank). Many advocates have rejoiced – no one wishes to see companies distributing fruits of the
poisoned tree.
But to what extent were local actors and stakeholders in and around the DRC consulted? What will the law mean for
the livelihood of millions in the troubled areas who survive by mining and haven’t any other means to live apart from
subsistence farming, which itself is often rendered untenable? What are the actual causes of violence in the conﬂict-
areas and to what extent do belligerents, whether rebel or government oriented (one often becomes the other)
actually depend on minerals for militaristic sustenance?
To answer these questions, similar laws including
Dodd-Frank and the Kimberley Process (which is
designed to certify whether diamonds are conﬂict-
free) beg consideration. So too do hundreds of
adopted amendments to the original EU proposal and
the international instruments of law that the EU law
incorporates by reference, for example the
Organisation for Co-operation and Development’s
(OECD) Due Diligence Guidelines. Have the OECD
Guidelines adequately addressed the fallout for
miners and their families in a brief appendix?
The matter is not strictly a trade issue. It is a human
rights issue, the wrongs of which may be fostered by
a particularised trade. It is an issue of whether the
means alleviates suﬀering on the ground in the DRC
and similar environs or is more likely only to alleviate
suﬀering consciences in the EU. Whether EU
measures will leave residents of the DRC, people the
law claims to beneﬁt, in better shape or in the lurch without genuine alternative means of survival. Whether the law
constitutes a modern form of a Western paternalism that foists harsh conditions on people in far-away places in the
name of compassion. Or whether the new EU law is the remedial culmination of laborious years of championing
human rights.
If we allow for the moment the latter interpretation, that the law is well intentioned and tailored to diminish if not end
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suﬀering such as killing, rape and exploitation, we can see what is in the minds of its authors by considering nearly
600 adopted amendments to the original text. For example, the amendments reveal an eﬀort to broaden the law’s
scope. The original text indicates that the law is aimed at “importers” who are responsible for conﬂict-exacerbating
minerals ending up in roughly 400 EU smelters and reﬁneries. “Importers” is replaced by the broader “operators”.
Similarly, a wider net is cast by replacing “Tin, Tungsten, Tantalite and Gold”, with the term “natural resources”. This
opens the door for the law’s application to other possibly conﬂict-exacerbating “resources” including, perhaps, oil.
Geographical broadening is demonstrated in referring to the speciﬁc eastern DRC region as more generally
“conﬂict-aﬀected, high risk areas”. “Mineral extraction” is replaced by “resource sourcing”. “Inter alia” is introduced in
numerous amendments, meaning that the clause mentioned is broadened to include “among other things”, not
restricted to its explicit terms. Long term policy concerns are hereby suggested, with provisions for evolving
updateable blacklisted “areas” and “operators”.
Meanwhile, gender advocates in the EU parliament inserted scores of amendments with references to women and
children, imbuing the proposal with a time tested imprimatur of moral legitimacy. This can have a chilling eﬀect on
challenges. Although there was ample opposition in the voting on these amendments, with 378 Members of
Parliament in favour, 300 against and 11 abstentions.
If the voting was intended to end or diminish a troubling form of proﬁteering, the only thing worse than toxic
economic activity is no economic activity. Living in the Great Lakes Region for more than a decade left me with deep
experiences of overwhelming impoverishment, where a torn shirt and trousers too often amount to a person’s sole
possessions.
Meanwhile, no one in particular is in possession of an estimated $24 trillion worth of tin, tungsten, tantalite and gold
in the DRC’s eastern hills. No one controls the area. With control unsettled, the peaceful aims of EU legislation are a
ﬁctive dream. Moreover, were the DRC government to gain full administration of its own territory, it is as big an
oﬀender of human rights as any other group including the proxies sponsored by surrounding countries.
Consolidation of the eastern region under the DRC as we know it now would promptly institutionalise violence,
human rights abuses, and generate increasing venues for corruption. What’s more, wouldn’t the minerals then be
labelled conﬂict-free, while the human rights abuses the law seeks to end continue apace?
If a law seeking to end the use of conﬂict-exacerbating resources is a worthwhile goal, short term suﬀering for the
people of the DRC is the cost. But is the new EU policy likely to have a long term beneﬁcial eﬀect? Or will it instead
be like shifting strategy to end needle exchange programmes and thus increasing the spread of HIV, while claiming
that there will be fewer future narcotics abusers because drug paraphernalia won’t be as readily available to them?
In other words, there are too many other factors in play.
Many factors are cited in the 2014 open-letter from seventy academics on several continents. They argue that
Dodd-Frank (and by implication European Dodd-Frank endorsement and mimicry) “fundamentally misunderstands
the relationship between minerals and conﬂict in the eastern DRC”. That “eight to ten million people across the
country are dependent on artisanal mining for their livelihood”.
Likewise, critics maintain that “Congolese miners are paying to ease the consciences of Western consumers”, while
only “8 percent of the country’s ongoing conﬂict has anything to do with natural resources”. That, moreover, “armed
groups are not dependent on mineral revenue for their existence”.
The existence of the new EU law fails to distinguish itself from Dodd-Frank in terms of fallout. As for the Kimberley
Process aimed at ending blood diamond proliferation, it has proven so ineﬀective that a chief proponent, the UK
based organisation Global Witness, has withdrawn support of the process it once worked hard to bring into
existence.
The European Parliament worked hard to incorporate the OECD’s Due Diligence Guidelines which include items
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such as assessing risks and carrying out third party audits. They are essentially the backbone of the law. It requires
several steps for “operators” to undertake to “prove” their activities don’t involve conﬂict minerals. The OECD Due
Diligence Guidelines’ 122 pages end with an 8 page Appendix entitled “Suggested measures to create economic
and development opportunities for artisanal and small-scale miners”. It is hard to imagine this brief Appendix, almost
an afterthought, amounts to anything meaningful for Congolese miners and dependents. Dodd-Frank lessons have
gone unheeded.
For all that, requiring companies or “operators” to carry the “conﬂict-free” burden is not in and of itself objectionable.
But with no reasonable certainty of future alleviation of suﬀering owing to diverse factors causing DRC violence, a
“wait and see” approach is in order for EU legislative observers. Unfortunately this connotes a potential “wait and
perish” scheme for many of the people the EU Parliament has set in its sights.
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